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Abstract
This study describes a model built on the long-held view that the use of money as
a medium of exchange is the result of an absence of double coincidence of wants.
The model can account for two of the most challenging observations facing
monetary theory: the disparate short-run and long-run effects of changes in the
quantity of money and the coexistence of money and assets with higher rates of
return. For both observations, the model’s ability to provide a rich analysis depends
on little more than the ingredients implicit in the absence-of-double-coincidence
view.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.In 1968, Samuelson (1968, p. 171) described the unsatis-
factory state of monetary theory by describing the experi-
ence of economics professors moving from one class pe-
riod to the next:
In a real sense there was a dichotomy in our minds; we were
schizophrenics. From 9 to 9.50 a.m. we presented a simple
quantity theory of neutral money. There were then barely ten
minutes to clear our palates for the 10 to 10.50 discussion of
how an engineered increase in M [the amount of money]
would help the economy.
The paper in which this description appears demonstrates
that the neutrality of money, a conclusion of an incoherent
model, also holds in a less incoherent model. The incoher-
ent model is the Arrow-Debreu model of general competi-
tive equilibrium with a quantity theory equation attached
to it.
1 That model is what was taught from 9 to 9:50. The
less incoherent model is the Arrow-Debreu model of gen-
eral competitive equilibrium with real money balances as
an additional argument of utility functions. That model is
not what was taught from 10 to 10:50, and Samuelson’s
paper is not about remedying the schizophrenia he talks
about in the above passage. Instead, Samuelson’s paper is
intended to ameliorate a more fundamental schizophrenia
concerning the way economists think about money.
The money in the quantity theory equation or in Sam-
uelson’s utility function is, no doubt, meant to be a medi-
um of exchange, a means of accomplishing exchanges be-
tween people.2 The use of a medium of exchange has long
been believed to be the result of real frictions that give rise
to what has come to be called an absence of double co-
incidence of wants. The more fundamental schizophrenia
afflicting the economics profession is that while holding
that belief, the great majority of economists working on
monetary issues have been and are using models that
somehow shove money into the frictionless setting that
forms the background for the Arrow-Debreu model of
general competitive equilibrium. Both of the models Sam-
uelson discusses, the quantity theory model and his utility
function model, are examples of that sort of model.
Perhaps the earliest statement about the role of money
in overcoming the lack of double coincidences is from the
2nd–3rd century Roman jurist Paulus who, according to
Monroe (1966, p. 10), said, “Since occasions where two
persons can just satisfy each other’s desires are rarely met,
a material was chosen to serve as a general medium of
exchange.” The continued belief in that role of money is
evidenced by the prominence given to it ever since. For
example, Smith (1776, pp. 22, 23) uses a version of it to
open the chapter of The Wealth of Nations titled “Of the
Origin and Use of Money”:
When the division of labour has been once thoroughly es-
tablished, it is but a very small part of a man’s wants which
the produce of his own labour can supply. He supplies the
far greater part of them by exchanging....
But when the division of labour ﬁrst began to take
place, this power of exchanging must frequently have been
very much clogged and embarrassed in its operations. One
man, we shall suppose, has more of a certain commodity
than he himself has occasion for, while another has less. The
former consequently would be glad to dispose of, and the
latter to purchase, a part of this superﬂuity. But if this latter
should chance to have nothing that the former stands in need
of, no exchange can be made between them . . . . In order to
avoid the inconveniency of such situations, every prudent
man in every period of society, after the ﬁrst establishment
of the division of labour, must naturally have endeavoured
to manage his affairs in such a manner, as to have at all
times by him, besides the peculiar produce of his own in-
dustry, a certain quantity of some one commodity or other,
such as he imagined few people would be likely to refuse in
exchange for the produce of their industry.
And the belief appears in Mishkin’s 1986 (p. 22) textbook
as motivation for the existence of money: “In a barter
economy, if Ellen [who can produce only brilliant eco-
nomics lectures] wants to eat, she must ﬁnd a farmer who
not only produces the food she likes, but also wants to
learn economics.”
Consistentwitheconomists’schizophrenicviewofmon-
ey, until very recently no one has actually used the ab-
sence-of-double-coincidence idea in any work on money.
Thus, for example, Smith (1776) makes no use of it in the
rest of The Wealth of Nations, and Mishkin (1986) makes
no use of it in the rest of his text. The ﬁrst attempt to use
or build on the absence-of-double-coincidence idea, as op-
posed to paying lip service to it, appeared in Ostroy 1970.
And not until the 1980s, in Diamond’s (1984) work on
search models and in the subsequent work of Kiyotaki and
Wright (1989), did economists succeed in constructing co-
herent models built on the absence-of-double-coincidence
idea. Kiyotaki and Wright’s (1989) model is especially
noteworthy because theirs is the ﬁrst model in which sev-
eral objects are potential media of exchange and in which
therelationshipbetweenthephysicalpropertiesofthoseob-
jects and their role as media of exchange can be studied.
Althoughmodelsbuiltontheabsence-of-double-coinci-
denceideaprovidearemedyforeconomists’schizophrenia
concerning money, considerable skepticism remains about
the value of those models. A primary concern is whether
such models are able to account for two observations that
have been regarded as the main challenges for monetary
economics. One observation is the disparate long-run and
short-run effects of changes in the quantity of money: the
seemingtendencyforlong-runeffectstobeprimarilynom-
inal and short-run effects to be predominantly real, the dis-
parity which is the source of the schizophrenia Samuelson
talks about. The other observation is described by Hicks in
a famous 1935 paper as the greatest challenge facing mon-
etary theory: the coexistence of money and assets with
higher rates of return. Why is money held when higher-re-
turn assets are available?
Here I describe a particular model built on the absence-
of-double-coincidenceideaanddemonstratethatthatmod-
el can account for both of the challenging observations
about money. That demonstration constitutes the main part
of this progress report. In addition, I deal brieﬂy with an-
other concern about existing models that are built on the
absence-of-double-coincidenceidea:theirextremefeatures.
I indicate how the particular model I use, which is extreme
in a number of respects, can be generalized so that the real
frictions can range from being present in extreme ways to
being absent. In the limiting case in which they are absent,
the model resembles the frictionless setting of the Arrow-
Debreu model of general competitive equilibrium.
An Absence-of-Double-Coincidence Model
I start by describing, in detail, a particular model which
incorporates the absence-of-double-coincidence idea. Toemphasize the connections between the model and long-
held views about the role of a lack of double coincidences,
IusetheSmith(1776)passageabovetomotivatethestruc-
ture of the model. First, the model contains more than one
time period; otherwise, Smith’s remark about what “few
people would be likely to refuse” cannot play a role. Sec-
ond, the model has two-person meetings, because Smith’s
discussion is in terms of such meetings. In particular,
Smith’s discussion is inconsistent with meetings of every-
one, which is the explicit or implicit assumption in most
modelswithmarkets.Third,aspecializationpatternamong
people motivates trade and is consistent with the lack of
double coincidences in two-person meetings. Finally, and
less evident, something in the model prevents trade from
being accomplished through some prior arrangement or
through the use of some form of credit, for example,
IOUs.
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In regard to time periods, I assume that time is discrete
and continues indeﬁnitely, because a certain, or sure, last
date creates problems, especially if money consists of in-
trinsically worthless objects like stones, shells, or pieces of
paper that are not promises to be redeemed for anything
else. Thus, I let the current date be date 0, and I let subse-
quent dates, in order, correspond to the positive integers
1, 2, 3, and so on.
Next, I assume a specialization pattern that implies a
completelackofdoublecoincidencesinmeetingsbetween
two people. Let there be N perishable goods at each date,
where N is an integer no smaller than 3. By perishable, I
mean that those goods have to be consumed in the same
period they are produced, or they are lost. Each person in
the model is one of N types, where type is determined by
the following specialization pattern in consumption and
production among the N goods: a type n person wants to
consume only good n and can produce only good n +1
(modulo N, so that type N produces good 1), for n =1 ,2 ,
..., N. Thus, with N ³ 3, when any two people meet, there
cannot be a double coincidence. There can be no coinci-
dence, which means that neither person produces what the
other consumes, or there can be a single coincidence,
which means that one person produces what the other con-
sumes but not vice versa. A single-coincidence meeting
occurs when and only when a type n person meets a type
n + 1 (modulo N) person for some integer n from 1 to N.
Further, in regard to preferences, a type n person likes
consuming (gets utility from consuming good n at any
date) and dislikes producing (gets disutility from produc-
ing good n + 1 at any date). Total utility, or well-being, at
any date is given by u(x)−y, where x is the amount of
good consumed and y is the amount of good produced.
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The function u is deﬁned on [0,¥), is increasing, is un-
bounded above, is twice differentiable, and satisﬁes u(0)
=0 ,u ²<0 ,u ¢ ( ¥ )=0 ,a n du ¢ (0) = ¥. (Both the utility of
consuming, the function u, and the disutility of producing,
the identity function, are shown in the accompanying ﬁg-
ure. An example of the u function which satisﬁes all the
assumptions is u(x)=x
1/2.)
Each person lives throughout the life of the economy.
Therefore, I have to describe how the person weights well-
beingacrossdates.Iassumethatthepersondiscountswell-
being in the future at a constant rate, denoted b, where b is
strictly between zero and one. Finally, since there is uncer-
tainty, I assume that each person acts so as to maximize
expecteddiscountedutility.Thus,ifEdenotestheexpected




t[u(xt)−y t], where xt denotes the amount
consumed (good n for a type n person) at date t and yt
denotes the amount produced (good n + 1 for a type n
person) at date t. Notice that u and b, the determinants of
preferences, are independent of type.That is oneof several
symmetries over types I assume to keep the model simple.
Another symmetry assumption is that there are equal
numbers of each type of person. In particular, there is a
[0,1] continuum of each type, meaning that there is a per-
son of each type corresponding to each real number be-
tween 0 and 1.
Now I describe how meetings occur in the model. I
want to end up with two-person meetings. If I give people
in the model too much freedom to choose whom they
meet, then I will not end up with two-person meetings. In
the model as so far speciﬁed, the only reason for people
to meet is to produce and trade, and the larger the number
of people in a meeting, the richer the production and trade
possibilities. Therefore, to end up with two-person meet-
ings, I have to assume that for more than two people to
meet is difficult or costly. In effect, I assume that it is im-
possible or inﬁnitely costly. I also assume that people can-
not choose whom to meet. Instead, each person at each
date is paired at random with one other person, where at
random means that the probability of one person meeting
another person with particular characteristics is the frac-
tion of those particular people in the entire population.
Therefore, the fraction of all meetings that are single-co-
incidence meetings is 2/N. In summary, people do not
choose whom they meet in this model. At each date, each
person runs into someone at random. In other words, this
random meeting is free, and any other meeting at that date
is impossible, is inﬁnitely costly.
In addition, people cannot commit themselves to future
actions. If they could—if at each meeting, some outside
enforcement could punish the participants for not carrying
out some explicit or implicit promise they made ear-
lier—then each producer could commit to producing y* in
a single-coincidence meeting, where y* is the unique solu-
tion to u¢(y*) = 1. (See the ﬁgure.) That would be a good
outcome and, given the enforcement, does not require the
use of a medium of exchange. I assume that such commit-
ment is not possible.
Finally, it may seem as if the assumption of pairwise
meetings with a continuum of people rules out the use of
credit. This assumption does rule out the possibility that
an IOU issued by a person gets back to the issuer with
positive probability. Therefore, such IOUs cannot be valu-
able, because if they were, everyone would always issue
them in order to consume and never produce. However,
ruling out such IOUs is not enough. I also need to rule out
the following golden-rule form of credit. If a producer in
a single-coincidence meeting thinks that he or she will
receive a gift in future single-coincidence meetings if he
or she gives a gift today, then the producer may well give
the gift today. To rule that out, I assume that each per-
son’s history—whatheorshedidinmeetingsinthepast—
is known only to the person, except to the extent that the
history is revealed by what the person owns now.
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assumption implies that a person who fails to give a gift
cannot be punished by not being given gifts subsequently,because no one in the future knows whether the person
gave a gift in the past.
Although the model as so far speciﬁed is special and
extreme, nothing in it is very distant from what is in Smith
1776. The model is special and extreme to make it simple.
That simplicity will be appreciated later. While Smith had
in mind that people choose to specialize in production and,
perhaps,toanextent,inconsumption,Isimplyassumethat
technologies and preferences are specialized. Also, Smith
might view the random meetings as extreme. But, as noted
above, that is a simple way to get the two-person meetings
he was talking about. It may seem, however, that I have
gone too far in the direction of clogging trade. Since there
are no double coincidences, since goods are perishable,
and since credit of any sort is impossible—can anything
happenwhentwopeoplemeet?Nothingcanhappenunless
some type of storable asset is put into the model. I do that
in the two sections that follow.
In the next section, in which I take up the long-run vs.
short-run challenge, I introduce one kind of asset, an in-
trinsically useless object I call a ﬁat asset. The ﬁat asset
functions as money in the model, and my analysis focuses
on the effects of changes in its quantity. In the succeeding
section, in which I take up the coexistence challenge, I in-
troduce two assets—a ﬁat asset and a dividend-bearing as-
set—the quantities of which never change. Despite those
differences, there are some common features in the two
sections. The N goods described above are perfectly divis-
ible, so that a producer is able to produce any nonnegative
amount. In contrast, the assets I introduce below are indi-
visible: they come in integer units. Also, in contrast to the
goods, they can be stored from one date to the next indef-
initely.However,throughoutIassumethateachpersoncan
store from one date to the next, at most, one unit of some
asset.Theonlyrationaleforthisextremeassumptionisthat
itmakesresultsrelativelyeasytoget.Becausethisassump-
tion has no other rationale and because it is so extreme
when coupled with the assumption that assets are indi-
visible, I comment in detail on what I think are the con-
sequences of weakening it by, for example, letting people
store any amount of assets.
With assets in the model, there is a possibility for trade.
Exactly how that trade occurs is described in the sections
that follow. Trade is somewhat different when the model
has one asset than when it has two. Essentially, trade oc-
curs if consumers in single-coincidence meetings have
assets that producers “imagined few people would be like-
ly to refuse [in the future] in exchange for the produce of
their industry” (Smith 1776, p. 23).
The Long-Run vs. Short-Run Challenge
Changes in the quantity of money are often accompanied
by disparate long- and short-run effects. In particular, the
long-run effects are often predominantly nominal, with the
price level changing in the same direction as the change in
the quantity of money, while the short-run effects are often
predominantlyreal,withoutputandemploymentchanging
in the same direction as the change in the quantity of mon-
ey. It is not an exaggeration to say that most of macroeco-
nomics, at least before the 1980s, has been an attempt to
explain these disparate effects. Certainly, this is true of
Keynes’(1936) General Theory and the work for which
Lucaswasawardedthe1995Nobelprize.Commentingon
his work, Lucas (1996, p. 661) says,
The work for which I have received the Nobel Prize was part
of an effort to understand how changes in the conduct of
monetary policy can inﬂuence inﬂation, employment, and
production. So much thought has been devoted to this ques-
tion and so much evidence is available that one might rea-
sonably assume that it had been solved long ago. But this is
not the case: It had not been solved in the 1970s when I
began my work on it, and even now this question has not
been given anything like a fully satisfactory answer.
Lucas’ comment is enough to establish the sense in which
the observation of disparate long- and short-run effects of
changes in the quantity of money is challenging. The ob-
servation is also important: how one accounts for the ob-
servationwillplayacrucialroleindeterminingone’sviews
about the desirable time paths of the quantity of money.
Theabsence-of-double-coincidencemodelcanproduce
those disparate long- and short-run effects, provided two
main requirements are met: (1) The quantity of money is
random. (2) People learn what happened to the quantity of
money with a lag. These requirements are not new; they
areimportantingredients inseveralmodelsconsistent with
the observed long- and short-run effects of changes in the
quantity of money, including Lucas’ Nobel prize–winning
work. That being so, one may reasonably ask, What is
gained by demonstrating that those requirements give rise
to similar effects in an absence-of-double-coincidence
model? The answer is that doing so shows that the ingre-
dients in the model, ingredients which give money a role
in overcoming the lack of double coincidences, are suffi-
cient to account for those effects.
In addition, the absence-of-double-coincidence model
suggests a new perspective on requirement (2), which is
often regarded as implausible for a modern economy. I
noted above that restrictions on what people know about
others are necessary to prevent some form of credit from
overcoming the lack of double coincidences. Against the
backgroundofsuchrestrictions,whichseemplausibleeven
in a modern economy, requirement (2), which also limits
what people know, ought to seem less implausible.
The Fiat Asset
I assume here that the only asset is the ﬁat asset. Hence, if
anything is to play a monetary role, it is the ﬁat asset. As
noted above, the ﬁat asset is indivisible, and each person
can store, at most, one unit of it. At the start of date 0,
there exists some quantity of the ﬁat asset per type, a
quantity denoted m0, which I assume to be positive and
less than one. Notice that if the entire quantity of the ﬁat
asset is held and if, as I assume, the initial holdings are
distributed symmetrically across types of people, then the
fraction of each type of person holding one unit is m0 and
the fraction of each type holding nothing is 1 − m0.
Changes in the quantity of the ﬁat asset, or money,
come about as follows. At the end of date 0, there is a one-
time increase in the aggregate quantity of it. This increase,
which itself is random, enters the economy through a
discovery process that is random among the people who
leave meetings at date 0 with nothing. In particular, at the
end of date 0, there is a once-and-for-all increase in the
amount of the ﬁat asset. This increase per type, denoted D,
isadrawingfromthefollowingdistribution,whichiscom-
mon knowledge at the start of date 0: D =Dkwith probabil-
ity pk,k= 1, 2, ..., K, where pk >0 ,K³2, Dk+1 > Dk, D1>0 ,m 0+D K£1/2, and the range of D, DK − D1, is suffi-
ciently small for reasons to be described later. Conditional
on D, each person who leaves a date 0 meeting without the
ﬁat asset discovers a unit of it with probability D/(1−m0).
This speciﬁcation satisﬁes requirement (1), randomness of
changes in the quantity of money. To satisfy requirement
(2), I assume that at date 1, no one knows D, although peo-
ple use their experience to help them decide what hap-
pened to the quantity of the ﬁat asset. That is, they use
their experience regarding discovery and their experience
regarding whether the person they meet at date 1 has the
ﬁat asset. Finally, I assume that everyone learns the real-
ization of D at the start of date 2.
I study a once-and-for-all change in the quantity of the
ﬁat asset because it is simple. I assume that only those who
leave meetings without the ﬁat asset are eligible to discov-
er a unit of it, because those with a unit would have to dis-
card it if they discovered an additional unit.
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tion that m0 + D£1/2 restricts the quantity of the ﬁat asset
to a range in which the probability of a meeting occurring
in which one person has the asset and the other does not,
a necessary condition for trade to occur in this model, is
increasing in its quantity. Since this necessary condition
arises only because of the upper bound on individual hold-
ings and since the upper bound is adopted only for tracta-
bility, it seems sensible to restrict the quantity of the ﬁat
asset to a range such that the probability of a meeting oc-
curringbetweensomeonewiththeassetandsomeonewith-
out it is increasing in the quantity. That range is [0,1/2),
because if m is the quantity of the ﬁat asset per type, then
thefractionofallsingle-coincidencemeetingsinwhichthe
potential consumer has it and the potential producer does
not is (1−m)m, which is increasing in m for m < 1/2. Fi-
nally, the assumption that everyone learns the realization
of D at the start of date 2 is also made for simplicity. It
allows me to describe what happens at dates 0 and 1 by
working backward from a simple description of what hap-
pens at date 2.
The Equilibrium Concept
An equilibrium is a description for each date, starting at
date 0 and stretching into the indeﬁnite future, of the fre-
quencies with which different kinds of meetings occur and
of what happens in those meetings. The sequence of ac-
tions at each date is as follows. At the start of each date,
each person has either one unit of the ﬁat asset or nothing.
Then people meet in pairs at random. Because of the indi-
visibility of the asset and the upper bound on individual
holdings, there is a potential for trade only when a type n
person meets a type n + 1 person and the type n + 1 per-
son, the potential consumer, has the ﬁat asset and the type
nperson, the potential producer, does not. I call such meet-
ings trade meetings. People in trade meetings bargain. If
the outcome of bargaining implies exchange, then produc-
tion and consumption occur. At all dates other than date 0,
that is all that happens. At all such dates, people take what
they left the meeting with, either a unit of the ﬁat asset or
nothing, and start the next date. Date 0 is slightly different.
After the meeting at date 0, each person who leaves a
meeting with no ﬁat asset has a chance of randomly dis-
covering a unit of it. Those who do discover a unit start
date 1 with the ﬁat asset.
In a trade meeting, the following simple bargaining
rule is assumed: The potential consumer makes a take-it-
or-leave-it offer consisting of a demand for some amount
of production in exchange for the consumer’s asset, and
the potential producer accepts if made no worse off by
accepting. A consequence is that the consumer makes so
stringent a demand on the producer, demands so much
production, that the producer is just on the margin be-
tween accepting the demand and rejecting it. I assume, as
is standard, that in this circumstance, the producer accepts.
The producer is willing to produce at all only because the
producer thinks he or she will be able to use the acquired
ﬁat asset in a subsequent trade meeting in which he or she
is the consumer. Hence, the producer’s view about the fu-
ture is crucial. As part of the equilibrium concept, I as-
sume, as is now standard, that the producer has rational
expectations about his or her subsequent potential uses of
the ﬁat asset. The above take-it-or-leave-it bargaining and
rational expectations constitute the equilibrium concept.
Suchtake-it-or-leave-itbargainingandrationalexpecta-
tionsdonotcompletelypindownwhathappens.Ifocuson
only one of the things that can happen—a symmetric equi-
librium in which the ﬁat asset has a positive value which
is constant from date 2 onward. I do not discuss potential
equilibria which are not symmetric and constant starting at
date 2. Not much is known about such equilibria. I also do
not discuss an equilibrium in which the ﬁat asset does not
have value. At the cost of slightly complicating the model,
that equilibrium could be eliminated.
7
As noted above, the assumptions permit existence of
equilibriawhicharesymmetricacrosstypesofpeople.One
of those assumptions is that the initial asset distribution is
symmetric across types. It is easy to show that if the asset
distribution at the start of a date is symmetric and if trades
and discoveries are symmetric, then the asset distribution
remains symmetric. Moreover, given the unit upper bound
on holdings of assets, there is only one symmetric asset
distribution at any date consistent with the total amount of
the ﬁat asset being held: if m is the per type amount of it
at the start of a date, then a fraction m of each type has a
unit of it and a fraction 1 – m has nothing. It follows that
the sequence of symmetric asset distributions is simple,
provided people do not discard the ﬁat asset: the date 0
distribution is the unique symmetric one with m = m0, and
the distribution at all other dates is the unique symmetric
one with m = m0 + D. This simple dependence of the ﬁat
asset distribution on the asset’s quantity is one of the main
simplicities achieved by the assumption that the ﬁat asset
is indivisible and that there is a unit upper bound on indi-
vidual holdings.
Given symmetric asset distributions, if mt is the amount
of the ﬁat asset at the start of date t, then the fraction of all
meetings that are trade meetings is (2/N)(1−mt)mt, where
2/N is the fraction of all meetings that are single-coinci-
dence meetings and (1−mt)mt is the fraction of those in
which the producer does not have the ﬁat asset and the
consumer does.
The Equilibrium Effects
I now describe what happens in the trade meetings at each
date and how what happens depends on D, the quantity of
the ﬁat asset discovered at the end of date 0. The following
claim, demonstrated in Wallace 1996b, asserts the ex-
istence of and describes the unique equilibrium in which
the ﬁat asset has a positive and constant value starting at
date 2.Claim1.Anequilibriumwiththefollowingfeaturesexists:
• The ﬁat asset is valuable at every date.
• The equilibrium is constant starting at date 2, and the
constant price level at t ³ 2 is increasing in D.
• At date 1, the price level does not depend on D, and
total output is increasing in D and varies with D more
strongly than at date 2 and thereafter.
Bylong-runeffectsofchangesinthequantityoftheﬁat
asset, I mean the dependence on D of what happens in that
equilibrium at date 2 and thereafter. By short-run effects,
I mean the dependence on D of what happens in the Claim
1equilibriumat date1.Inotherwords, long-runeffectsare
those in a date 2 cross section, while short-run effects are
those in a date 1 cross section—cross sections from econ-
omies that are identical except for the realization of D.
Date 2 is the long run because the equilibrium is constant
starting at that date. Date 1 is the short run because it im-
mediately follows the change in the quantity of the ﬁat
asset.
To explain Claim 1, I start by associating magnitudes in
the Claim 1 equilibrium with the price level and total out-
put. As explained further below, for a given realization of
D and a given date t, the amount produced in each trade
meeting is the same, an amount denoted ct(D). Since ct(D)
exchanges for one unit of the ﬁat asset in every trade, the
price level at date t and for a given realization of D is
1/ct(D). In regard to total output, I noted above that the
fraction of all meetings which are trade meetings at date
t is (2/N)(1−mt)mt and that at date 1 and thereafter, mt
= m0 + D. It follows that total output is the product of that
fraction, N (the number of types), and ct(D). Thus, if Yt(D)
denotes total output at date t and for a given realization of
D, then for t ³ 1,
(1) Yt(D) = 2(1−m0−D)(m0+D)ct(D).
Becausem0 +D£1/2, (1−m0−D)(m0+D)is increasingin D.
That is, the fraction of all meetings that are trade meetings
is increasing in D. That is a source of expansionary real ef-
fects of changes in the amount of the ﬁat asset.
The Long Run
At the start of date 2, everyone knows D. Thus, starting at
date 2, the model has a constant and known amount of the
ﬁat asset per type. That is why there is an equilibrium in
which what happens in each trade meeting is constant
from date 2 onward. In this equilibrium, the amount pro-
duced in each trade meeting at date t for t ³ 2 is decreas-
ing in mt, because at any such date t, the probability of a
consumer meeting a producer without the ﬁat asset is
(1−mt)/N. Hence, the greater is mt, the lower is that prob-
ability. Therefore, a producer, looking ahead to that prob-
ability, is willing to produce less to acquire the ﬁat asset
the larger is mt. Therefore, for t ³ 2, ct(D) is decreasing in
D. Because the price level is the inverse of the amount
produced, it follows that for t ³ 2, the price level is in-
creasing in D. In addition, because the only future gain to
a producer is the possibility of consuming ct(D) and be-
cause the producer discounts the future, it must be that the
utility of consuming ct(D), u(ct(D)), exceeds the disutility
of producing ct(D), which implies that ct(D)<x *. (See the
ﬁgure.)
By equation (1), total output is the product of two func-
tions. One function is the probability of a trade meeting
occurring. That part, given by 2(m0+D)(1−m0−D), is iden-
tical at t = 1 and t ³ 2 and, under my assumption about the
range of D, is increasing in D. The other function is the
amount produced in a trade meeting, ct(D). At t ³ 2, ct(D)
is decreasing in D. Therefore, the model makes no deﬁnite
qualitative prediction about how total output at date 2 and
thereafter varies with D.
The Short Run
Each producer in a trade meeting at date 1 knows how the
value of the ﬁat asset in a trade meeting at date 2 and
thereafter varies with D. In other words, each knows what
the long run is like for a given realization of D. But no
producer at date 1 knows what D is. Therefore, each acts
on the basis of an expected value—the expected value of
theexpecteddiscountedutilityofstartingdate2withaunit
of the ﬁat asset. The expected value is computed using the
producer’sposteriordistributionoverD.Thatposteriordis-
tribution is arrived at using Bayes’ rule, the prior distri-
bution given by pi, and the experience of each producer.
Each producer in a trade meeting at date 1 has been
through the same experience: each left a meeting at date 0
without the ﬁat asset, did not discover a unit of it, and met
someone with a unit of it. The producer does not know
whether the consumer left a meeting at date 0 with the ﬁat
asset or left without the ﬁat asset and subsequently discov-
ered a unit of it.
8 Therefore, the posterior distribution of
eachproduceristhesame.Moreover,eachproducer’strad-
ingpartnerknowstheproducer’sexperienceand,therefore,
the producer’s posterior distribution. It follows that the
maximum amount produced in every trade meeting at date
1 is the same and does not depend on D.
9 Therefore, I de-
note it c1. In fact, c1 is a weighted average of the amounts
produced at date 2 for each possible realization of D, the
c2(D), with weights given by the common posterior distri-
bution of producers at date 1.
Finally, I must argue that each consumer in a trade
meeting at date 1 is willing to give up the ﬁat asset for c1.
There are two kinds of consumers, those who left a meet-
ing at date 0 with the ﬁat asset and those who left without
the ﬁat asset and discovered a unit of it. The two kinds of
consumers have different posterior distributions over D—
distributions that differ from those of producers at date 1.
To ensure that both kinds of consumers want to trade the
ﬁat asset for c1, I assume that the range of D is small
enough so that both kinds of consumers will want to trade
at date 1 even if the producer’s posterior distribution puts
a weight of unity on the largest possible D and consumers
put a weight of unity on the smallest possible D. (One way
to see that there is always such a range is to notice that if
there is no uncertainty about the aggregate amount of the
ﬁat asset discovered, then what happens at dates 1 and 2
will be the same.)
Because all trade at date 1 consists of the exchange of
c1 for one unit of the asset, the price level at date 1 is 1/c1
and, therefore, does not depend on the realization of D.A
consequence is that total output at date 1 is increasing in D,
because c1(D) in equation (1) does not depend on D and
because the fraction of meetings that are trade meetings is
increasing in D. Finally, even if total output is increasing in
D at date 2, it follows from (1) and the conclusions aboutc2(D) and c1(D) that total output varies more strongly with
D at t = 1 than at t ³ 2.
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Although I could also describe what happens at date 0
meetingsandtherebycompletethedescriptionoftheClaim
1 equilibrium, there is no reason to do that here. The long-
run vs. short-run comparisons I am after are given by the
descriptions above. In the long run, the price level is in-
creasing in the aggregate discovery of the ﬁat asset, while
total output could be increasing (but less strongly than in
the short run), could be decreasing, or could be nonmono-
tone in the aggregate discovery of it. In the short run, the
price level does not depend on the aggregate discovery of
the ﬁat asset, while total output is increasing in the aggre-
gate discovery of it.
Robustness
Although the model contains many extreme assumptions,
two deserve special attention: the public knowledge at the
start of date 2 about the realized change in the quantity of
the ﬁat asset and the indivisibility of the ﬁat asset with the
upper bound on individual holdings.
Theassumptionthateveryonelearnstherealizedchange
in the quantity of the ﬁat asset with a one-date lag is made
to keep the model simple. The natural assumption is that
people never learn the realized change, but only draw in-
ferences about it based onexperience. I see twodifficulties
with that assumption or even with an assumption that
lengthens the lag with which everyone learns the realiza-
tion. One difficulty is that prior distributions over D get
revised in accord with experience (at least experience re-
garding what the trading partner has). Because experience
is diverse, an analysis would have to keep track of groups
thatarediverseintermsoftheirposteriordistributionsover
the change in the amount of the ﬁat asset. The other dif-
ﬁculty is that the bargaining would then be between two
people who do not know each other’s posterior distribu-
tions. Despite these difficulties, it is plausible that the qual-
itative features I ﬁnd for the one-date information lag for-
mulation would continue to hold, but not in the same way.
Under the natural assumption, people wouldeventually (in
the limit) learn the realization, because the probability of
meeting someone with the ﬁat asset is m0 + D and because
the frequency of such meetings becomes a better estimate
of that probability as time passes. Therefore, there ought to
be an equilibrium that converges to what happens at date
2 under the one-date information lag formulation. More-
over, although the implied short run would then merge
smoothly into the long run, rather than end abruptly after
one date as under my assumption, the effects would again
be entirely real at date 1 and mainly real for several dates
thereafter.
The assumption that the ﬁat asset is indivisible and that
there is a unit upper bound on individual holdings is also
made to keep the model simple. One implication of that
formulation is that those who discover the ﬁat asset are not
producers at date 1: either they are consumers or they do
not trade—that being a consequence of the indivisibility
and the upper bound. If there is no upper bound, then the
discovery process can be random among everyone. Given
suchrandomness,totaloutputatdate1maynotbeincreas-
ing in the aggregate discovery, because producers who
have discovered the ﬁat asset will tend to produce less.
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One way to amend the model to restore such dependence
is to allow people some choice about whether to produce
or to consume. If there is such choice, then those who dis-
cover the ﬁat asset will tend to be consumers. Such a
choice appears in some closely related matching models,
butthosemodelsalsoincludetheindivisibilityandunitup-
per bound assumption. (See Diamond 1984 and Kiyotaki
and Wright 1991.)
My ﬁnal comment on the assumptions is to point out
similarities between the model and the ingredients in the
following passage from Hume (1752, pp. 37, 38):
Accordingly we ﬁnd, that, in every kingdom, into which
money begins to ﬂow in greater abundance than formerly,
every thing takes a new face: labour and industry gain life;
the merchant becomes more enterprising....
To account, then, for this phenomenon, we must con-
sider, that though the high price of commodities be a neces-
sary consequence of the encrease of gold and silver, yet it
follows not immediately upon that encrease; but some time
is required before the money circulates through the whole
state, and makes its effect be felt on all ranks of people. At
ﬁrst,noalterationisperceived;bydegreesthepricerises,ﬁrst
of one commodity, then of another; till the whole at last
reaches a just proportion with the new quantity of specie
which is in the kingdom. In my opinion, it is only in this
interval or intermediate situation, between the acquisition of
money and rise of prices, that the encreasing quantity of gold
and silver is favourable to industry. When any quantity of
money is imported into a nation, it is not at ﬁrst dispersed
into many hands, but is conﬁned to the coffers of a few
persons, who immediately seek to employ it to advantage.
Here are a set of manufacturers or merchants, we shall sup-
pose, who have received returns of gold and silver for goods
which they sent to Cadiz. They are thereby enabled to em-
ploy more workmen than formerly, who never dream of
demanding higher wages, but are glad of employment from
such good paymasters . . . . [The artisan] carries his money to
market, where he ﬁnds every thing at the same price as for-
merly, but returns with greater quantity and of better kinds,
for the use of his family. The farmer and gardener, ﬁnding,
that all their commodities are taken off, apply themselves
with alacrity to the raising more . . . . It is easy to trace the
money in its progress through the whole commonwealth;
where we shall ﬁnd, that it must ﬁrst quicken the diligence of
every individual, before it encrease the price of labour.
The model and Hume’s discussion are similar in that both
contain two, and only two, main explanatory ingredients:
trade is decentralized in the sense that not everyone is to-
gether, and information about the quantity of money is in-
complete in that, at most, some people, those “who have
received returns of gold and silver for goods which they
sent to Cadiz,” know that it has increased.
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The Policy Implications
The implications of the model of the disparate long- and
short-run effects of changes in the quantity of money are
much like those of other models which rely on uncertainty
about the quantity of money and incomplete information
about realizations of changes in the quantity. The model
implies that the short-run effects depend on those condi-
tions and should not be expected to occur for changes in
the quantity of money that do not satisfy those conditions.
Inparticular,ifthechangeintheaggregateamountofmon-
eywere known by everyone at date 1, then there would be
only long-run effects. That is, my description of what hap-
pens at date 2 and thereafter would hold for date 1 and
thereafter. Obviously, this holds for the case of a degener-
ate prior distribution of changes in the quantity of mon-ey—at date 0, everyone knows what the aggregate change
will be.
Hume, by the way, can be accused of failing to recog-
nize the importance of the asymmetric and incomplete in-
formationaboutthequantityofmoneythatispresentinhis
passage above. Hume (1752, pp. 39, 40) concludes his dis-
cussion of the effects of increases and decreases in the
quantity of money as follows:
From the whole of this reasoning we may conclude, that it
is of no manner of consequence, with regard to the domestic
happiness of a state, whether money be in a greater or less
quantity. The good policy of the magistrate consists only in
keeping it, if possible, still encreasing; because, by that
means, he keeps alive a spirit of industry in the nation, and
encreases the stock of labour, in which consists all real pow-
er and riches.
The model can be used to appraise Hume’s policy rec-
ommendationifhisrecommendationcanbetranslatedinto
one concerning m0 and the distribution of D. The choice
of a recommendation concerning m0 and the distribution
of D is consistent with the model if I suppose, as seems
plausible, that a society can choose its money from among
ﬁat objects—objects with different supply conditions in
the form of different m0’s and distributions of D. (The
objects not chosen, if they are ﬁat objects, can be value-
less in equilibrium.) Moreover, if I judge the consequen-
ces of different m0’s and distributions of D as of date 0
before people know whether they do or do not start out
with a unit of the ﬁat asset, then those consequences can
be judged using a representative agent welfare criterion,
(1−m0)v0(0) + m0v0(1), where v0(i) is the expected dis-
counted utility of starting date 0 with i units of the ﬁat
asset. In Wallace 1996b, I report one numerical example
in which I hold m0 ﬁxed and compare distributions with
the same mean and different variances. In that example,
representative agent welfare is decreasing in the variance.
Hume seems to favor a distribution of D with a positive
mean to one with no change in the quantity of money (D
º 0).
The Coexistence Challenge
The coexistence of money and higher-return assets is the
othermainchallengefacingmonetarytheory.Hicks(1935)
called attention to the coexistence about 60 years ago, and
today monetary theorists still regard it as a challenge. (See,
for example, Hellwig 1993.) A standard result in econom-
ics is that rates of return on different assets of equal riski-
ness tend to get equalized. The coexistence challenge is to
explainwhymoneyisfreefromthisequalizationtendency.
The coexistence is also important because different inter-
pretationsofit,differentexplanationsforit,giverisetodif-
ferent policy prescriptions. Some interpretations of the co-
existence suggest, for example, that policy ought to be
directed toward equalizing the returns on money and other
assets through some device for paying interest on money.
A starting point of an explanation for the coexistence is
to notice that the standard result that returns tend to get
equalized has behind it several assumptions, the most
important of which is that all assets are traded on competi-
tive markets to which everyone has access. Therefore, one
route—in effect, a necessary route—to explaining the co-
existence is to depart from that assumption. The pairwise
meeting model set out above does depart from it and in an
extreme way. Indeed, using that model is, in a sense, bend-
ing over backward to get the coexistence, because the
model gives considerable scope to the familiar notion that
the use of a particular object as a medium of exchange is
a coordinating device and cannot be explained in terms of
the intrinsic properties of the object, including its rate of
return. (See, for example, Tobin 1980.)
13 Such an idea can
even be read into Smith’s (1776, pp. 22, 23) absence-of-
double-coincidence passage, where he says that “every
prudent man . . . must naturally have endeavoured to man-
age his affairs in such a manner, as to have at all times by
h i m...acertain quantity of some one commodity or oth-
er, such as he imagined [emphasis added] few people
would be likely to refuse in exchange for the produce of
their industry.” My model gives scope to that coordination
idea, because people in my model have to think about, or
imagine, what others will subsequently accept from them.
Therefore, my model gives scope to the possibility that a
belief that the higher-return asset is not accepted in trade is
a self-sustaining belief.
The Dividend-Bearing Asset
I now assume that there are two distinct assets. One asset
is identical to the ﬁat asset described earlier. The other as-
set is similar, except that it throws off a dividend, denoted
r, per period. I call this second asset the r asset. I assume
that the dividend, r, is in the form of a perishable good
that is distinct from all the other N goods and is a perfect
substitute for the consumption good of any type. I let Am
denotethe constantamount ofthe ﬁatasset pertype and let
Ar denote the constant amount of the r asset per type. I
assume that Am + Ar < 1. I also assume that the initial asset
distribution is symmetric across types of people so that,
initially, Am is the fraction of each type who begin with a
unit of the ﬁat asset and Ar is the fraction of each type who
begin with a unit of the r asset.
The Equilibrium Concept
Here, as in the model with one asset, an equilibrium is a
description for each date, starting at date 0 and stretching
into the indeﬁnite future, of the frequencies with which
different kinds of meetings occur and of what happens in
those meetings. The sequence of actions at each date is as
follows. At the start of each date, each person has either
one unit of one of the assets or nothing. Then those who
start with a unit of the r asset realize and consume the
dividend r. (Thus, I am not allowing dividends, as distinct
from assets, to be traded.) Next, people meet in pairs at
random and bargain. Because of the upper bound of unity
on individual holdings of assets and because of the as-
sumed symmetry across types of people, here, as in the
model with one asset, there is a potential for trade only in
single-coincidence meetings. Now, however, there are two
situations in which trade can possibly occur. In one, the
producer has no asset and the consumer has an asset—
either the ﬁat asset or the r asset. In the other, the con-
sumerhasamorevaluableasset thantheproducerhas and,
therefore, can offer the more valuable asset and acquire in
exchange some production and the less valuable asset. If
the outcome of bargaining implies exchange, then produc-
tion and consumption occur. In regard to bargaining, I
continue to assume that the potential consumer makes a
take-it-or-leave-it offer and that the potential producer
accepts if made no worse off by accepting. Thus, as above,this take-it-or-leave-it bargaining and rational expectations
constitute the equilibrium concept.
Again, such take-it-or-leave-it bargaining and rational
expectations do not completely pin down what happens. I
restrict attention to equilibria that are symmetric across
types of people. In this model, as in the model with one
asset,iftheinitialassetdistributionissymmetricandtrades
aresymmetric,thentheassetdistributionremainssymmet-
ric. Also, as above, here there is only one symmetric asset
distribution consistent with all assets being held, namely,
the initial symmetric asset distribution. That being so, the
frequency with which various kinds of meetings occur is
determined by the asset amounts and N.
The Equilibrium Effects
As was true in the model with one asset, there is an equi-
librium here in which the ﬁat asset has no value. In what
follows, I ignore this equilibrium. In regard to equilibria in
which the ﬁat asset has value, any such constant equilibri-
um will display the coexistence I am after. In such a con-
stant equilibrium, the yield on the ﬁat asset, either real or
nominal, is zero. If the r asset is traded, then its yield is r
divided by the amount of production for which it trades
and is, therefore, positive. If the r asset is not traded, then
it has a bid price, what someone is willing to produce in
order to acquire it, and an ask price, what someone will
demand in order to give it up. When either of those prices
is used, the yield is, again, positive. However, I am in-
terested in more than such coexistence. I show that the
magnitude of the yield on the r asset is associated with the
frequency with which it is traded: a lower yield is associat-
ed with a higher trading frequency.
Although all the parameters in the model determine the
kind of equilibria that can arise, I describe how the equilib-
ria depend on r when all the other parameters are held
constant. If r is sufficiently close to zero, then the r asset
functions as another valued ﬁat asset. That is, it is traded
frequently, and its yield approaches zero as r approaches
zero. If, instead, r is sufficiently large, then it is not traded,
and its yield is higher than when r is close to zero. More-
over, in the ﬁrst case, the yield on the r asset is affected by
the quantity of the ﬁat asset, while in the second case, it is
not. I describe these results in more detail as a list of
claims.
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I begin with a preliminary discussion of a necessary
condition for the r asset not to be traded. A holder of a
unit of the r asset always has the option of holding it for-
ever and never trading it. In that case, the holder of the r
asset consumes r at every date and thereby realizes utility
equal to u(r) at every date. The result is an expected dis-
counted utility of u(r)/(1−b). In a constant equilibrium
with the take-it-or-leave-it bargaining rule, the expected
discounted utility of having no asset is zero. Therefore, if
a holder of the r asset meets a potential producer with no
asset, then that producer is willing to produce at least
bu(r)/(1−b) to acquire the r asset, because that producer
can, at worst, hold the r asset forever. Therefore, a neces-
sary condition for a holder of the r asset to refuse to trade
is
(2) u(r)/(1−b) ³ u(r +[ b u ( r )/(1−b)])
where the left side is what the holder gets by never trading
the asset and the right side is the minimum of what the
holder gets by offering the r asset to a producer with no
asset. It is easy to demonstrate that this condition fails for
r sufficiently close to zero and holds for r sufficiently
large. With this as background, I describe, in turn, the con-
stant equilibria when r is sufficiently close to zero and
when r is sufficiently large. In what follows, I let cm de-
note the amount produced in exchange for a unit of the ﬁat
asset and let cr denote the amount produced in exchange
for a unit of the r asset. I also let crm denote the amount
produced when the producer acquires the r asset and sur-
renders the ﬁat asset and let cmr denote the amount pro-
duced when the producer acquires the ﬁat asset and sur-
renders the r asset.
Small Dividends
I arrive at the results in this case by starting with r = 0 and
using continuity to draw conclusions about what happens
with r close to 0. Therefore, I begin by describing the
symmetricandconstantequilibriawithbothassetsvaluable
when r =0 .
Iassumethatthetwoassetsaredistinguishablebysome-
thing irrelevant like their colors, even if r = 0. But if r
= 0, then there is an equilibrium in which the two assets
are treated as indistinguishable.
Claim 2. If r = 0, then there is exactly one symmetric and
constant equilibrium with cm = cr >0 .( Il e tc *denote this
common positive value of cm and cr.) In this equilibrium,
crm = cmr =0 .
This equilibrium is identical to the one in the long-run
part of the Claim 1 equilibrium if m0 + D = Am + Ar.
Next, I let r be positive, but close to zero. There is an
equilibrium in which the value of each asset is close to c*.
Claim 3. If r is positive and sufficiently close to zero, then
there is an equilibrium near the Claim 2 equilibrium with
cm(r)>c r( r )>c *and cmr(r) > 0. (This equilibrium is near
the Claim 2 equilibrium in the sense that cm(r) ® c* and
cmr(r) ® 0a sr®0.)
Notice three things about this equilibrium. First, the ﬁat
asset is more valuable than the r asset. (There is no con-
stant equilibrium near the Claim 2 equilibrium in which
the r asset is at least as valuable as the ﬁat asset.) Second,
trade occurs in all the potential trading situations described
above. In particular, trade occurs in single-coincidence
meetingswhentheproducerhasnoassetandtheconsumer
has either asset and when the producer has the r asset and
the consumer has the ﬁat asset. Thus, the r asset functions
as a second valuable ﬁat asset. Third, the yield on the r as-
set approaches zero as r approaches zero. Moreover, the
yield on the r asset depends on the quantity of the ﬁat as-
set, Am, because the yield on the r asset is approximately
equal to r/c* and because c* depends on Am.
When r = 0, the Claim 2 equilibrium is not the only
equilibriuminwhichbothassetshavevalue. Therearetwo
other equilibria.
Claim 4. If r = 0, then there is a symmetric and constant
equilibrium with cr = c* and cmr > 0, and there is a sym-
metric and constant equilibrium with cm = c* and crm >0 ,
where c* is deﬁned in Claim 2.
These Claim 4 equilibria can be described as endog-
enous denomination equilibria.
15 In each of them, one of
the assets is treated as more valuable than the other. Thereare two such equilibria, because either asset can be treated
as the more valuable asset. (If Am = Ar, then the two Claim
4 equilibria are identical, except for the irrelevant labeling
of which is more valuable. If Am ¹ Ar, then the two equi-
libria are not identical.) Notice that the less valuable asset
in these equilibria has the value that both assets have in the
Claim 2 equilibrium.
Trade occurs if the producer has no asset and the con-
sumer has the less valuable asset and if the producer has
the less valuable asset and the consumer has the more val-
uable asset. Trade may or may not occur if the producer
has no asset and the consumer has the more valuable asset.
If the discount factor is sufficiently close to one, then trade
does not occur in those situations. In effect, the consumer
is not willing to spend all of his or her wealth at once. If
the discount factor is sufficiently close to zero, then trade
does occur.
The next claim describes analogs of the Claim 4 equi-
libria when r is positive and close to zero.
Claim 5. If r is positive and sufficiently close to zero, then
there are equilibria that are close to the Claim 4 equilibria.
In particular, there is a constant equilibrium with cr(r)>c *
and cmr(r) > 0, and there is a constant equilibrium with
cm(r)=c *and crm(r) > 0. (These equilibria are near the
Claim 4 equilibria in the sense that cr(r) ® c*, cmr(r) ®
cmr, and crm(r) ® crm as r®0, where cmr and crm are
given in Claim 4.)
Claim 5 can be summarized by saying that a small pos-
itivedividendcanbeattachedeithertothelessvaluableas-
set in Claim 4 or to the more valuable asset without much
affecting the equilibrium. If the dividend is attached to the
less valuable asset, then its yield is approximately r/c*.I f
it is attached to the more valuable asset, then its yield is
approximately r/(c*+crm). In either case, the yield ap-
proaches zero as the dividend approaches zero. Also, here,
as was true for the equilibrium of Claim 3, the yield de-
pends on the quantity of the ﬁat asset.
Large Dividends
As suggested above, if r is sufficiently large, then holders
of the r asset do not trade. In particular, if r satisﬁes a
strengthened version of inequality (2), then there is a
unique constant equilibrium in which the ﬁat asset has val-
ue, anditisoneinwhichholdersoftherassetdonottrade.
Claim 6. Let x* be the unique positive solution to u(x*)
= x*. (See the ﬁgure.) If r is such that
(3) u(r)/(1−b) ³ u(r +[ b u ( r )/(1−b)]) + x*
then there is a unique symmetric and constant equilibrium
in which the ﬁat asset has value. It is one in which holders
of the r asset do not trade and in which cm(r)=c *.
In the Appendix, I show that all sufficiently large r
satisfy inequality (3). The existence part of Claim 6 is
established by construction. If only the ﬁat asset is traded,
then cm does not depend on r and is equal to c* in Claim
2 where, of course, c* < x*. Given the implied expected
discounted utility of starting a date with the ﬁat asset,
which is bc*, and given the expected discounted utility of
starting a date with the r asset when it is not traded,
u(r)/(1−b), the existence claim follows if a potential
consumer with the r asset will not want to give it up to a
potential producer who either has no asset or has the ﬁat
asset. As shown in the Appendix, inequality (3) is suffi-
cient for that to be true. The uniqueness claim follows
from the fact that the left side of inequality (3) is a lower
bound on the expected discounted utility of starting a date
with a unit of the r asset.
If the r asset is not traded, then it does not have a price
in the sense of the amount of the good exchanged for it. It
does, however, have a bid price, bu(r)/(1−b), and an ask
price, the solution for x to u(r+x)=u ( r )/(1−b). I can,
therefore, measure the yield on the r asset as the ratio of r
to one of those prices. When either price is used, that yield
does not depend on Am, the amount of the ﬁat asset, and is




Because the above claims deal with only very small and
very large dividends, they do not constitute a complete de-
scription of even the symmetric and constant equilibria.
Nevertheless, the claims are sufficient for my purposes.
They show that the role of the r asset in trade and its yield
depend on its physical characteristics. If the dividend is
sufficiently close to zero, then the r asset functions like a
second valuable ﬁat asset. If, instead, the dividend is very
large, then the r asset does not. In regard to its yield, the
real yield is lower if the dividend is sufficiently small than
if it is sufficiently large. Thus, as asserted above, the yield
on the r asset is associated with the frequency with which
the asset is traded: a lower yield is associated with a higher
trading frequency.
Finally, it follows that anticipated inﬂation and the
yield on the r asset are associated in different ways in the
two cases. The speciﬁcation in the model with only the ﬁat
asset permits me to analyze the effects of a one-time non-
random change in the amount of the ﬁat asset that produc-
es an anticipated inﬂation. If r is close to zero, then the
realyieldontherassetdependsonthatanticipatedchange
in the amount of the ﬁat asset. If, instead, r is sufficiently
large, then the real yield on the r asset does not depend on
the change. All of this holds for changes in the amount of
the ﬁat asset that are small enough to be consistent with
the ﬁat asset being valuable.
In a sense, these results are unsurprising. After all, if the
dividend is sufficiently small, then the r asset is physically
like the ﬁat asset; otherwise, the r asset is not. Therefore,
these results show only that if the r asset is physically
sufficiently like the ﬁat asset, then there are equilibria in
which the r asset functions like the ﬁat asset; otherwise, it
does not. Such results are surprising only against the back-
ground of most of existing monetary theory. As empha-
sized in Wallace 1996a, most of existing monetary theory
has no implications for the relationship between the phys-
ical characteristics of objects and their role in trade.
Robustness
I have shown that the ﬁat asset can have value despite the
existence of the r asset. That result may be due, however,
to the assumed asset indivisibility with a unit upper bound
on individual holdings of assets. That assumption permits
only very indirect competition between the ﬁat asset and
the r asset. For example, no one is ever in the position of
having both assets and choosing which to offer. In that
sense, the mere ﬁnding of coexistence is not surprising.Not much is known about equilibria under more gen-
eral assumptions about individual asset holdings. My
guess is that indivisibility of the r asset is crucial for the
coexistence, but that the bound on individual holdings is
not. That is, my guess is that if the r asset were perfectly
divisible, then its existence in any positive amount would
be inconsistent with a positive value for the ﬁat asset. If
that were so, then I would have another instance of the
result that the physical characteristics of the assets have
implications for their values and for their roles in trade.
Again, that seems surprising only against the background
of most of existing monetary theory.
I do not mean to suggest by this discussion that perfect
divisibility is the only assumption of interest. Divisibility
has long been regarded as a desirable property of a medi-
um of exchange. Divisibility would not warrant mention if
it were not rare, that is, if most objects were perfectly
divisible.
The Policy Implications
The standard view among economists is that coexistence
of money and higher-return assets is a symptom of non-
optimality. (See, for example, Samuelson 1968, Friedman
1969, and Lucas 1986.)17 Friedman (1969) is generally
credited with suggesting a remedy for this nonoptimality,
one which has come to be known as the Friedman rule:
Pay interest on money either explicitly or by generating
enough deﬂation to make the nominal interest rate zero; in
either case, ﬁnance the interest through taxation. (See
Friedman 1960, 1969.) The model above does not have
that implication if only because, as the model stands, taxa-
tion is not feasible. That, however, should not be regarded
as a defect of the model.
A discussion ofpolicy should includedefensible claims
about the policies that are feasible. And no one should be
surprised if the restrictions needed to give monetary trade
a role limit the range of feasible policies. Conversely, as-
sumptions about feasible policies may beinconsistent with
the restrictions needed to give monetary trade a role.
For example, suppose I amended the model in the fol-
lowing extreme way so that it is consistent with taxation.
Suppose there is an additional person, a disinterested pub-
lic servant, who participates in each pairwise meeting
between the other people and who can tax them. Instead
of taxing to pay interest on money, the public servant
could simply direct production and consumption in each
single-coincidence meeting as could happen if people
could commit themselves to future actions. In particular,
in each single-coincidence meeting in which the consumer
has consumed r because the consumer starts with the r
asset, the producer could be directed to produce and give
max(0,y*−r) to the consumer. In all other single-coinci-
dence meetings, the producer could be directed to produce
and give y* to the consumer, where y* satisﬁes u¢(y*)=1 .
(See the ﬁgure.) That good outcome, as judged by the
welfare of people at date 0, could then be achieved with-
out using money.
Less Extreme Assumptions
The results above should make economists less skeptical
about the value of models built on the absence-of-double-
coincidenceidea.Thoseresultsdemonstratethatsuchmod-
els are well-suited to confront two long-standing chal-
lenges in monetary economics: the disparate long- and
short-run effects of changes in the quantity of money and
the coexistence of money and higher-return assets. How-
ever, those results are obtained in a model which, while
built on the absence-of-double-coincidence idea, seems
very extreme. In order for such models to win wide ac-
ceptance, they must be amenable to generalizations that
make themless extreme.Happily,theyare. HereIdescribe
particular ways of generalizing three of the extreme as-
sumptions in the model: the indivisibility of assets with a
unit upper bound on individual holdings, pairwise meet-
ings at random, and private information about the history
of each person’s actions except insofar as that history is
conveyed by the person’s current holdings of assets.
In regard to individual asset holdings, an alternative
extreme is perfectly divisible assets with no bound on in-
dividual holdings. A one-dimensional way to ﬁll the gap
between that extreme and the speciﬁcation in the model is
to vary the degree to which assets are indivisible and to
vary the upper bound on asset holdings. In particular, sup-
pose B is a positive integer that is the upper bound on indi-
vidual holdings of indivisible assets. Suppose also that the
amount of each indivisible asset is proportional to B and
that the dividend of each asset is inversely proportional to
B. Then total dividends are independent of B, B =1i st h e
speciﬁcation adopted above, and divisibility with no upper
bound is approached as B ®¥ . As I noted above, my
conjecture is that if there is a positive dividend-bearing
asset, then the use of a ﬁat object does not survive in the
limit as B ®¥ . Of course, divisibility is only one among
many physical characteristics that could differ among as-
sets and make some more suitable in trade than others.
In regardto pairwise meetings atrandom, an alternative
extreme is that everyone is together at every date. If com-
petitive equilibrium is taken to be the equilibrium concept
with everyone together, then the unique equilibrium with
everyone together has relative prices of all goods at each
date equal to unity, has a constant real interest rate equal to
b
−1 − 1, has a zero value of the ﬁat asset, has each person
withoutadividend-bearingassetconsumingandproducing
y*, and has each person with a dividend-bearing asset pro-
ducing max(0,y*−r) and consuming max(y*,r). (See the
ﬁgure.) A simple one-dimensional way to ﬁll the gap be-
tween the extreme with everyone together and pairwise
meetings at random is to have meetings of J people at
random.Ingeneral,thatpermitssomedoublecoincidences.
If the only asset is a ﬁat asset, then a plausible conjecture
is that there is some role for the ﬁat asset for any ﬁnite J,
but that its value tends to zero as J ®¥ .
In regard to privacy of the history of people’s actions,
the alternative extreme is public knowledge of every per-
son’s history. As demonstrated in Kocherlakota 1996, if
there is public knowledge of every person’s history, then
the use of outside assets for trade is inessential in the sense
thatanyallocationachievableusingoutsideassetsfortrade
is also achievable without using them. A one-dimensional
way of ﬁlling the gap between the two extremes of no
public knowledge and complete public knowledge is to
assume that at each date t, every person’s history up to t
− T is public knowledge for some nonnegative integer T.
Then T = ¥ is no public knowledge, while T =0i s
complete public knowledge. I surmise that there would be
some role for both outside assets in trade and some role for
some form of credit for at least some positive and ﬁnitemagnitudes of T. Kocherlakota and Wallace 1996 demon-




just indicated or in other ways may be difficult, the above
speciﬁcationsshowthatthereisnothinginherentlyextreme
about models built on the absence-of-double-coincidence
idea. Therefore, it seems that a suitable remedy for the
schizophrenia that has for so long afflicted monetary eco-
nomics is now available. Economists are now able to for-
mulate a general class of models consistent with the long-
held belief that the use of a medium of exchange is the
result of real frictions that give rise to absence-of-double-
coincidenceproblems.AsIhavedemonstrated,aparticular
model in this class can account for the two main challeng-
esfacingmonetarytheory:thedisparatelong-runandshort-
run effects of changes in the quantity of money and the
coexistence of money and assets with higher rates of re-
turn. One form that further progress will take is the de-
tailed study of the general class of models.
1The quantity theory equation, in symbols, is MV = PY, where M is the assumed
exogenous quantity of money, V is the assumed exogenous velocity of money, P is the
endogenous price level, and Y is real income, which is determined by the general com-
petitive equilibrium part of the model.
2In a footnote, Samuelson (1968, p. 179) says, “This [money as an argument of
utility functions] is not the only way of introducing the real convenience of cash bal-
ances. An even better way would be to let U [utility] depend only on the time stream of
qs [quantities of ordinary goods], and then to show that holding an inventory of M
[money] does contribute to a more stable and greatly preferable stream of consump-
tions.”
3Otherwise,whycan’tMishkin’s(1986)EllengetfoodbyissuingIOUsthatprom-
ise delivery of brilliant economics lectures—IOUs which themselves get traded until
they end up in the hands of those who want brilliant economics lectures and present
themaspaymenttoEllen(itbeingunderstoodthatatleastsomeonevaluesbrillianteco-
nomics lectures)?
4The assumption that the disutility of production is equal to the amount produced
is without loss of generality. For details, see Aiyagari, Wallace, and Wright 1996.
5The role of this assumption and the inability to commit is emphasized in Aiyagari
and Wallace 1991. See also Huggett and Krasa 1996 and Kocherlakota 1996.
6A versionin which everyone can discover a unit of theﬁat asset would differ only
in insigniﬁcant details. Alternatively, a version in which, after trade at date 0, people
choosewhethertoexpendsomesmallamountofeffortinordertobeeligibletodiscover
a unit would not differ at all.
7One way to eliminate that equilibrium, while preserving the equilibrium in which
the ﬁat asset has value, is to assume that the ﬁat asset yields a small amount of utility
when consumed. That kind of assumption is used in Sargent and Wallace 1983.
8A version of my model in which producers can distinguish between the two kinds
of consumersbecause newly discoveredmoney looks differentfrom old moneyfor one
date gives rise to similar qualitative predictions for long- and short-run effects, but has
different amounts produced in meetings with the two different kinds of consumers. For
details, see Wallace 1996b.
9Consumers who did not discover a unit of the ﬁat asset want to signal that fact to
producers. By limiting their strategies to the naming of an amount of production to de-
mand, I do not permit them to do that.
10If the support of D is speciﬁed to be an interval, then the derivative of Y2(D) with
respect to D evaluated at the magnitude of D at which c2(D)=c 1is less than the deriv-
ative of Y1(D).
11The assumption that new money goes to consumers appears in many other mod-
els. See, for example, Lucas 1972, Lucas and Woodford 1993, and Eden 1994. Barro
and King 1984 emphasizes the important role of the assumption and questions the
rationale for it.
12Somewhat surprisingly, in light of the passage cited above, Hume’s general
discussion of money does not allude to the absence of double coincidence of wants and
is limited to the following remark: “[Money] is none of the wheels of trade: It is the oil
which renders the motion of the wheels more smooth and easy” (Hume 1752, p. 33).
13Indeed, versions of such models are known to be consistent with the use as a
mediumofexchangeofobjectswhichhaveintrinsicpropertiesworsethanthoseofsome
other objects. See Kiyotaki and Wright 1989, Aiyagari and Wallace 1992, and Renero
1994, 1995.
14These results are related to results in Aiyagari, Wallace, and Wright 1996; how-
ever, because they are not identical, proofs of them are given in the Appendix.
15The Claim 4 equilibria and the Claim 2 equilibrium can also be interpreted as
multiple exchange rate equilibria. It should be evident that if r = 0 and if the two assets
are perfectly divisible, then there is an equilibrium for any constant relative value be-
tween them. When theassets areindivisible, the multiplicity islimited, but it stillexists.
16Evidently, I could have studied a version of my model with three assets: a ﬁat
asset, a r asset with r close to zero, and a r asset with r satisfying inequality (3). The
result would be a combination of the Claim 6 equilibrium and either a Claim 3 or a
Claim 5 equilibrium.
17That is not true, however, in all models. See, for example, Woodford 1990 and
Levine 1991.
18KocherlakotaandWallace(1996)assumethatateachdate,allofhistorybecomes
public knowledge with some probability, say, g. The result is an expected number of
most recent dates equal to 1/g during which what happened is not public knowledge, so
that g= 1correspondsto completepublic knowledgeand g =0corresponds tonopublic
knowledge.Diamond(1990)andShi(1995)haveversionsofrandommatchingmodels
with outside assets and credit, but their formulations are far from straightforward.
Diamond permits people who reach a credit agreement to stay together, an option
otherwise not available.
Appendix
Proofs of Claims 2–6
Here I develop the proofs for Claims 2–6 presented in the pre-
ceding text.
Istartwithageneralsetupinwhichtherearetwoassets,asset
1 and asset 2, each with a dividend. Therefore, I now let ri be
the dividend per unit of asset i and let Ai be the amount of asset
i per type for i = 1, 2. I also let vi be the expected discounted
utility of starting a date with a unit of asset i. (Again, because of
the assumed bargaining rule, the expected discounted utility of
starting a date with no asset is zero.) Because I am not commit-
ted to anyspecial assumption aboutthe dividends, I can,without
loss of generality, assume that asset 2 is at least as valuable as
asset 1. That is, I can assume that v2 ³ v1.
Thedeﬁnitionbelowembedstheconsequenceofthebargain-
ing rule that the consumer demands sufficient production from
the producer to keep the producer indifferent between trading
and not trading.
DEFINITION. A symmetric and constant equilibrium is a pair
(v1,v2) that satisﬁes v2 ³ v1 and
(A1) v1 = amax[u(r1+bv1), u(r1)+b v 1] + (1−a)[u(r1)+b v 1]
(A2) v2 = amax[u(r2+bv2), u(r2)+b v 2]
+( A 1/ N)max{u[r2 + b(v2−v1)] + bv1, u(r2)+b v 2}
+ [(1−a−A1)/N][u(r2)+b v 2]
where a = (1−A1−A2)/N.
In equation (A1), a is the probability of any person meeting a
potential producer with no asset. Such a meeting gives a holder
of asset 1 the option between, on the one hand, realizing a cur-
rent date utility u(r1+bv1) and starting the next date with no
asset (which, as noted above, has an expected discounted utility
of zero) and, on the other hand, choosing not to trade. If the ﬁrst
option is chosen, the producer produces bv1, because that is the
producer’s discounted gain from acquiring a unit of asset 1.
With the remaining probability, a holder of asset 1 gets the pay-
off from not trading. Although a holder of asset 1 can also trade
if he or she meets a holder of asset 2 who consumes what the
holder of asset 1 produces, such a trade leaves the holder of
asset 1 with the same payoff as not trading. Equation (A2) de-
scribes the probabilities and respective options for a holder of
asset 2. The second term in that equation represents the options
for a holder of asset 2 who meets a potential producer who
holds asset 1.Claims 2–5
I establish these claims by studying the solutions to (A1) and
(A2) for r1 and r2 close to zero. Because v2 does not appear in
equation (A1), (A1) can be solved for v1. Then that solution can
be substituted into (A2), which is then solved for v2.
Solutions to (A1) for Small r1
When I let c1 ºb v 1, and I add and subtract a[u(r1)+b v 1]o nt h e
right side of (A1), I ﬁnd that (A1) is equivalent to
(A3) c1(1−b)/b = amax{u(r1+c1)−[ u ( r 1)+c 1], 0} + u(r1)
º F(r1,c1).
The functionF(0,c1)isas showninthe accompanyingﬁgure.
In particular, that function is continuous for c1 ³ 0, is positive
and strictly concave for 0 < c1 < x*, and is zero for c1 ³ x*. Here,
as in the preceding text, x* is the unique positive solution to
u(x*)=x *. (See the ﬁgure in the text.) Also, ¶F(0,0)/¶c1 = ¥.I t
follows that the equation c1(1−b)/b = F(0,c1) has two non-
negativesolutions:c1=0and,bytheintermediatevaluetheorem,
a second solution that is positive and denoted c*. (See the ﬁgure
in this Appendix.)
The function F(r1,c1) is continuous and increasing in r1.I t
follows that for r1 > 0 and close to zero, there exists a unique
solution to equation (A3)—a solution, denoted c1(r1), which is
increasing inr1 and which satisﬁesx* > c1(r1)>c *and c1(r1) ®
c* as r1 ® 0.
Solutions to (A2) for Small r1 and r2
When I let c21 ºb ( v 2 − v 1 ), and I add and subtract [(a+A1)/N]
×[ u ( r 2)+b v 2 ] on the right side of (A2), I ﬁnd that (A2) is
equivalent to
(A4) (c21+c1)(1−b)/b
= amax{u(r2+c21+c1)−[ u ( r 2)+c 21 + c1], 0}
+( A 1/ N )max{u(r2+c21)−[ u ( r 2)+c 21], 0}
+ u(r2)
º G(r2,c21,c1)
where c1 should be interpreted as c1(r1), the positive solution to
(A3) described above. The function G(r2,c21,c1) is continuous
in c21 for c21 ³ 0. Also, G(0,c21,c1) is positive for 0 £ c21 < x*
and is zero for c21 ³ x*, where, as above, x* is the unique
positive solution to u(x*)=x * . Moreover, ¶G(0,0,c1)/¶c21 = ¥,
and G(0,0,c*)=F (0,c*). It follows that the equation (c21+c*)
× (1−b)/b = G(0,c21,c*) has at least two nonnegative solutions
for c21: c21 = 0 and, by the intermediate value theorem, at least
one positive solution. The zero solution establishes Claim 2.
The positive solution establishes Claim 4 (which is Lemma 2 in
Aiyagari, Wallace, and Wright 1996).
Next, notice that G(r2,c21,c1) is continuous and increasing in
r2. That and the above results for the positive solution to (A3)
establish Claims 3 and 5, as I now explain. I start with Claim
3. Suppose that r1 > 0 and r2 = 0. Then, by (A3), F(r1,c1(r1))
> G(0,0,c1(r1)). Therefore, [0 + c1(r1)](1−b)/b > G(0,0,c1(r1)).
However, since ¶G(0,0,c1(r1))/¶c21 ®¥as r1 ® 0, there is a
solution to equation (A4) with c21 positive and close to zero.
That is the Claim 3 solution. Notice, however, that if r1 = 0 and
r2 > 0, then there does not exist such a solution, because (0+c*)
× (1−b)/b < G(r2,0,c*).
Now for Claim 5. I noted above that the equation (c21+c*)
× (1−b)/b = G(0,c21,c*) has at least one positive solution for c21
and that any such solution is less than x*. Note that G(0,c21,c*)i s
twice differentiable in c21, except at c21 = x* − c*. Consider the
smallest positive solution to (c21+c*)(1−b)/b = G(0,c21,c*). This
smallest solution is equal to x* − c* only for a set of measure 0
in the parameter space and, hence, can be ignored. (Fix all the
parameters, including A = A1 + A2, except A1. Then c*, the
function (c21+c*)(1−b)/b, and x* do not depend on A1, while G is
increasing in A1. It follows that c21 = x* − c* is a solution to
(c21+c*)(1−b)/b = G(0,c21,c*) for only one value of A1.) Because
G has a negative second derivative, except at c21 = x* − c*,i t
follows that the smallest positive solution to (c21+c*)(1−b)/b
= G(0,c21,c*) is such that ¶G(0,c21,c*)/¶c21 < (1−b)/b. That and
the fact that ¶F(0,c*)/¶c1 < (1−b)/b allow me to invoke the im-
plicit function theorem, which says that for (r1,r2) in a neigh-
borhood of (0,0), there exists a solution for c1 and c21 that is
close to the Claim 3 solution. Claim 5 is a consequence.
Claim 6
This proof has three parts. I ﬁrst show that inequality (3) in the
preceding text holds for all sufficiently large magnitudes of r.
Then I establish the existence claim and, ﬁnally, the uniqueness
claim.
Inequality (3) for Large r
For any x > 0 and y >0 ,u ²< 0 implies that u(x+y)<u ( x )
+u ¢ ( x ) y. Therefore, for any r >0 ,
(A5) u(r +[ b u ( r )/(1−b)]) + x*
£ u(r)+[ u ¢ ( r ) b u ( r )/(1−b)] + x*
={ u ( r )[(1−b)+u ¢ ( r ) b ]/(1−b)} + x*
º h(r).
Therefore,
(A6) u(r)/(1−b)−h ( r )={ u ( r )[1 − u¢(r)]b/(1−b)} − x*.
As r®¥ ,u ( r )®¥and u¢(r) ® 0. It follows that the left side
of equation (A6) is positive for all sufficiently large magnitudes
of r. Then inequality (A5) implies that inequality (3) holds for
all such magnitudes of r.
Existence of Equilibrium
In terms of the deﬁnition above, the proposed equilibrium is
v1 = vm = bc* and v2 = vr = u(r)/(1−b). Because c* < x* and
inequality (3) holds, the proposal satisﬁes v2 ³ v1. And because
Claim 2 implies that the proposal satisﬁes equation (A1), it
remains only to verify that equation (A2) is satisﬁed. That is, I
have to show that
(A7) max{u(r +[ b u ( r )/(1−b)]), u(r)/(1−b)} = u(r)/(1−b)
(A8) max{u(r +[ b u ( r )/(1−b)] − bvm) + bvm, u(r)/(1−b)}
= u(r)/(1−b).
Because bvm = c* < x*, inequality (3) implies satisfaction of
equations (A7) and (A8).
Uniqueness
If there is another such equilibrium, then it has vr ³ u(r)/(1−b)
and has the r asset being traded. The r asset must be either asset
1 or asset 2 in the deﬁnition. To be asset 1 and be traded, the r
assetmust beofferedwhen theproducer hasnoasset. Therefore,
vr must satisfy u(r)+b v r£u ( r + b v r ). However, because in-
equality (3) implies that this inequality fails for vr = u(r)/(1−b),
it fails for all vr ³ u(r)/(1−b). To be asset 2 in the deﬁnition and
be traded, the r asset must either be traded when the producer
has no asset or be traded when the producer has the ﬁat asset.
The former has just been ruled out. The latter implies that vr and
vm satisfy
(A9) u(r)+b v r£u ( r+b ( v r− v m) )+b v m
<u ( r + b v r)+x *.Inequality (3) says that inequality (A9) is not satisﬁed for vr
= u(r)/(1−b). It follows that it is not satisﬁed for any vr ³ u(r)
÷ (1−b).
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Solutions to (A3) for Small r1
x*
F (r1,c1)
for r1 > 0
F (0,c1)
c* c1(r1)
u(r1)
c1
c1(1–b)/b